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The paper argues that the weakest link principle, which has been widely used as a measure of 
ultimate owners’ control rights, has a number of serious problems. A theoretically more 
satisfactory method of measuring control rights, based on voting power indices, is proposed, 
and the different measures are compared using a sample of large listed German firms. The 
different measures produce very different results. But, whichever measure is used, taking 
account of pyramid ownership structures has little effect on the values of control and cash-
flow rights. The results also show that neither first-tier nor ultimate control rights measures 
are adequate on their own, suggesting that further work on ownership structure and pyramids 
is required to obtain satisfactory measures of large owners’ control rights. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In most countries, the typical listed company is controlled by a single large 
shareholder. The key conflict of interest in corporate governance is thus  between the 
controlling  shareholder  and  minority  shareholders,  rather  than  between  dispersed 
shareholders  and  professional  managers  who  run  the  firm  but  have  little  or  no 
ownership stake. The extent of this conflict of interest depends on the relationship 
between  the  control  rights  and  the  cash-flow  rights  of  the  controlling shareholder 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1997, La Porta et al. 1999, Claessens et al. 2000, 2002, Faccio et 
al. 2001, Faccio and Lang 2002). Other things equal, the greater the control rights of 
the controlling shareholder - her ability to influence the way the company is run - the 
greater  her  ability  to  obtain  private  benefits  of  control  at  minority  shareholders’ 
expense.  These  private  benefits  of  control  can  take  many  forms.  The  controlling 
shareholder can, for example, use business relations between the company and other 
firms that she wholly owns to exploit minority shareholders. Thus transfer pricing can 
be  used  to  shift  profits  from  the  company  with  minority shareholders to the firm 
wholly  owned  by  the  controlling  shareholder,  or  the  company  with  minority 
shareholders can invest in assets that are then sold or leased at favourable terms to the 
wholly-owned firm (Johnson et al., 2000). Alternatively, if the controlling shareholder 
is also a manager of the company, minority shareholders can be exploited by paying a 
high  salary  to  the  controlling  shareholder.  Evidence  of  private  benefits  of  control 
obtained by controlling shareholders has been provided by Barclay and Holderness 
(1989), Bergström and Rydqvist (1990), Zingales (1994), Nenova (2003) and Dyck 
and  Zingales  (2004).  However,  the  greater  the  cash-flow  rights  of  a  controlling 
shareholder – the fraction of the firm’s profits to which she is entitled – then, other 
things equal, the more closely her incentives are aligned with those of the minority 
shareholders, and hence the lower her incentives to pursue costly policies which divert 
profits from minority shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Thus the conflict of 
interest  is  likely  to  be  more  severe  if  the  controlling  shareholder’s  control  rights 
substantially exceed her cash-flow rights. 
 
The  control  rights  of  an  owner  of  a  firm  refer  to  that  owner’s  ability  to 
influence the firm’s operations, and the magnitude of these rights clearly depend in 
some way upon the owner’s share of the total voting rights in the firm. But, rather   2 
than  developing  a  measure  of  control  rights  that  is  related  to  voting  rights,  the 
empirical literature on control and cash-flow rights of ownership has, following La 
Porta et al. (1999), equated control rights with voting rights.
1 This approach has some 
problems. One is that an owner’s power to determine the outcome of a vote by all 
owners is not, in general, accurately reflected by that owner’s voting rights, as the 
extensive literature on voting power indices has shown (see Felsenthal and Machover 
1998). A second problem is that in many cases this approach makes it impossible to 
distinguish control rights from cash-flow rights. If all shares in a company have equal 
voting and dividend rights then, if control and voting rights are equated, the control 
and cash-flow rights of the first-tier owners of the company will be identical.
2 To 
circumvent this latter problem, empirical studies of differences between control and 
cash-flow rights that have equated the former with voting rights have had to identify a 
separate measure of cash-flow rights. There are two main ways in which this can be 
done.  First,  if  firms  issue  classes  of  share  that  differ  in  terms  of  their  relative 
proportion  of  voting  rights  and  dividend  entitlement,  then  it  is  possible  to  obtain 
separate measures of control and cash-flow rights even when the former are equated 
to voting rights. Second, if all shares have the same voting and dividend rights but the 
owner of a firm exercises control via a chain of other firms – a pyramid – the owner’s 
control and cash-flow rights will differ even when the former are equated with voting 
rights. 
 
Recent empirical studies have emphasised the second of these two ways of 
obtaining  separate  measures  of  control  and  cash  flow  rights  when  the  former  are 
equated with voting rights. Faccio et al. (2001) focus on pyramiding as the source of 
differences between the controlling shareholder’s control and cash-flow rights in their 
analysis of the effect of these two forms of ownership rights on dividend payout rates 
in Western European and East Asian companies. In their analysis of the relationship 
between firm value and the control and cash-flow rights of the largest shareholder in 
East Asian companies, Claessens et al. (2002) consider both pyramid structures and 
                                                 
1 “To evaluate the potential for agency problems between ultimate owners and minority shareholders, 
we  also  want  to  know  whether  the  cash  flow  ownership  rights  of  the  controlling  shareholders  are 
substantially different from their voting rights” (La Porta et al, 1999, page 477). See also Faccio et al. 
(2001) and Claessens et al. (2002). 
2 First-tier owners are the immediate owners of a company, as distinct from ultimate owners, which are 
the owners revealed by investigating the ownership of the first-tier owners, the second-tier owners, and 
so on.   3 
shares with different voting rights as sources of differences between control and cash-
flow rights, but pyramiding is by far the more important, since only 43 of the 1,301 
corporations in their sample issue shares with different voting rights. 
 
But there is a difficulty with these two studies and others that have focused on 
pyramiding  as  the  source  of  the  separation  between  control  and  cash-flow  rights 
(Claessens et al. 2000, Faccio and Lang 2001, and La Porta et al 1999). It is not 
obvious how to use the voting rights at each tier of a pyramid to derive a measure of 
the  control  rights  of  owners  who  exercise  control  in  this  way.  All  the  studies 
mentioned  have  used  the  weakest-link  principle  (henceforth  WLP).  This  principle 
assigns control rights to the controlling shareholder on the basis of the minimum value 
of voting rights across the different links of a control chain. Thus, if a controlling 
shareholder has 40 per cent of the voting rights in firm A, and firm A has 20 per cent 
of the voting rights in firm B, according to the WLP this shareholder has control 
rights of 20 per cent in firm B. The cash-flow rights of this shareholder in firm B are 
eight per cent (40 per cent of 20 per cent). Despite its popularity in empirical studies, 
the WLP is largely an ad hoc measure with little theoretical underpinning, and thus 
has some potentially serious problems as a measure of control rights, as discussed in 
Section 2 below. 
 
This paper advocates using voting power indices to relate control to voting 
rights. Such an approach has two major advantages. First, it can distinguish owners’ 
control from cash-flow rights even when all shares have the same voting and dividend 
rights and no owner exerts control through a pyramid. Second, it permits measures of 
the control rights of owners who exercise control via a pyramid to be obtained that are 
theoretically more satisfactory than those given by the WLP. These advantages make 
it possible both to evaluate the robustness of conclusions based on the WLP, and to 
study the effects of large owners’ control and cash-flow rights empirically without 
having to rely on the existence of pyramids and different classes of share to obtain 
separate measures of such rights. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses how voting power indices 
can  be  used  to  measure  the  control  rights  of  owners  of  firms.  It  also  considers    4 
problems with the WLP as a measure of the control rights of ultimate owners (those at 
the top of a pyramid), and shows how voting power indices can be used to provide 
alternative measures of ultimate owners’ control rights. Section 3 uses a sample of 97 
large listed German firms to compare control rights measures based on voting power 
indices with those in which control rights are equated with voting rights, at both first-
tier  level  (i.e.,  taking  no  account  of  pyramids)  and  ultimate  ownership  level.  To 
evaluate  which  of  these  measures  is  most  satisfactory,  Section  4  compares  their 
performance as explanatory variables in a regression model of the determinants of a 
firm’s market-to-book ratio of equity value. Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
2. Measures of control rights 
 
2.1 Voting power indices 
 
  There is an extensive literature on measures of the ability of a single voter to 
influence the outcome of a vote, and these voting power indices provide a natural way 
to derive a measure of the control rights of owners of a firm. Such indices have been 
used  in  some  studies  of  corporate  governance  (Leech  1988,  2002,  Pohjola  1988, 
Rydqvist 1986, Zingales 1994, Zwiebel 1995), but they have not become generally 
accepted as measures of control rights for reasons that are assessed below.  
 
The two best known are the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf voting power indices 
(Shapley  and  Shubik  1954,  Banzhaf  1965).  These  are  illustrated  in  the  following 
simple example. A company has three shareholders: shareholder 1 has 45 per cent of 
the votes, shareholder 2 has 35 per cent, and shareholder 3 has 20 per cent. Decisions 
are made by simple majority vote, so a proposal that receives at least 50 per cent of 
the votes will be enacted. What is the ability of each shareholder to influence the 
outcome of a vote? 
 
  The Shapley-Shubik voting power index answers this question by making a 
voter’s power proportional to the number of times that voter is pivotal in a sequential 
coalition of voters, i.e., the number of times that voter changes a sequential coalition 
from a losing to a winning one by entering it. A sequential coalition is one formed by   5 
adding one voter at a time, with the order in which voters enter being important. In the 
example above, there are 6 (=3!) sequential coalitions containing all three players
3, as 
follows: {1,2,3}, {1,3,2}, {2,1,3}, {2,3,1}, {3,1,2}, {3,2,1}. The pivotal voter in each 
coalition is, respectively, 2, 3, 1, 3, 1, 2. The Shapley-Shubik index (SSI hereafter) for 
a particular voter is the number of times that voter is pivotal divided by the number of 
times all voters are pivotal. In this example, there are six sequential coalitions and 
hence six pivotal voters in total. Each individual voter is pivotal twice, so each voter 
has  a  SSI  of  33.33  per  cent.  This  example  illustrates  clearly  voting  power,  as 
measured by the SSI, is not equal to voting rights. 
 
The Banzhaf voting power index (BZI hereafter) measures a voter’s ability to 
influence the outcome of a vote by making voting power proportional to the number 
of times that voter is a critical voter, i.e., the number of times that voter changes a 
winning coalition into a losing one by leaving it. A winning coalition is a coalition of 
voters that has enough votes to win. In the example, there are four winning coalitions: 
{1,2}, {1,3}, {2,3} and {1,2,3}. The critical voters in each are, respectively, 1 and 2, 
1 and 3, 2 and 3, and none. The BZI for a particular voter is the number of times that 
voter is critical divided by the number of times all voters are critical. Each voter in the 
example thus has a BZI of 33.33 per cent, and voting power again differs from voting 
rights. 
 
In this simple example, voting power is the same whether measured by the SSI 
or  the  BZI,  but  in  general  the  two  indices  give  different  results.  Suppose  that  a 
company has a single large shareholder, with 45 per cent of the votes, and 55 small 
shareholders each owning one per cent of the votes. In this case, the SSI for the large 
shareholder is 80.41 per cent, while each small shareholder has a SSI of 0.355 per 
cent. In contrast, the BZI for the large shareholder is 100 per cent, and each small 
shareholder has a BZI of zero. This second example not only illustrates that the SSI 
and BZI can give different results. Together with the first example, it also shows that 
the  power  of  a  given  holding  of  voting  rights  (45  per  cent  in the two examples) 
depends greatly on the distribution of the other voting rights. 
 
                                                 
3 With N players, there are N! sequential coalitions   6 
The fact that the SSI and the BZI often give substantially different measures of 
the voting power associated with a given distribution of voting rights is one reason 
why these indices are not more widely used as measures of voting power. Another 
reason is that the theoretical foundations of the two indices are not clear-cut.
4 In this 
paper, no attempt is made to resolve the question of which voting power index is 
theoretically preferable. Instead, the paper uses measures of control rights based on 
both the SSI and the BZI alongside a measure in which control rights are equated to 
voting  rights,  and  compares  the  empirical  performance  of  these  three  measures  
systematically. 
 
One  problem  that  typically  arises  when  voting  power  indices  are  used  to 
measure  shareholder  voting  power  is  that  not  all  shareholdings  are  observed,  and 
hence assumptions must be made about the unobserved voting rights. The unobserved 
voting  rights  are  usually  those  held  by  very  small  shareholders,  so  a  natural 
assumption to make is that the total unobserved voting rights are dispersed over an 
infinitely large number of shareholders. This case is known as the oceanic one in the 
literature on voting power indices: there exists a large number (in the limit, an ocean) 
of  ‘minor’  voters  with  positive  total  voting  rights,  but  the  voting  rights  of  each 
individual minor voter tend to zero. The values given by the SSI are not very sensitive 
to the assumption made about unobserved voting rights, but this is not true for the 
BZI, and the SSI and BZI behave very differently in the oceanic case, as Dubey and 
Shapley (1979) show. If there is a single large shareholder holding a fraction x < 0.5 
of  the  voting  rights,  the  remaining  fraction  1-x  is  held  by  an  ocean  of  small 
shareholders, and a simple majority is required to win a vote, then the SSI for the 
large shareholder is x/1-x, while the BZI is always 100 per cent.
5 Thus if a firm has a 
single large shareholder holding five per cent of the voting rights, and an ocean of 
small  shareholders  holding  the  remaining  95  per  cent,  the  SSI  for  the  large 
shareholder is 5.26 per cent but the BZI is 100 per cent. If the 95 per cent is held by 
190 shareholders each with 0.5 per cent of the votes rather than by an ocean of small 
shareholders, the SSI for the large shareholder is 5.24 per cent, while the BZI is 5.91 
                                                 
4 Felsenthal and Machover (1998) suggest that the two indices correspond to different conceptions of 
power. 
5 The general result is that the BZIs for the major voters in a situation with an ocean of minor voters are 
given by the BZIs for a different voting game, in which the only voters are the major voters and the 
fraction of votes required to win is equal to that in the original game less half the fraction of votes held 
by the ocean. See Dubey and Shapley (1979, pp. 110-118) for a full discussion.   7 
per cent. The value of the BZI is thus extremely sensitive to the assumption made 
about the unobserved voting rights, and the assumption that these are held by an ocean 
of small shareholders may not be appropriate when using the BZI. In the absence of a 
compelling alternative, however, the oceanic assumption is used in this paper. 
 
 
2.2 The weakest-link principle 
 
  The  WLP  measures  control  rights  in  terms  of  actual  voting  rights:  when 
control is exercised via a pyramid, it assigns control rights to the ultimate owner on 
the basis of the minimum value of actual voting rights across the different links of a 
control chain. Use of the WLP appears to originate with La Porta et al. (1999). It has 
also been used in the studies by Claessens et al. (2000), Claessens et al. (2002), Faccio 
and Lang (2002), and Faccio et al. (2001). La Porta et al. divide the firms in their 
sample into those that are widely held and those that have ultimate owners (several 
different types of which are identified). A firm has an ultimate owner if a controlling 
shareholder with more than some threshold value of voting rights (La Porta et al. use 
both 10 and 20 per cent as threshold values) can be identified using the WLP. A firm 
is widely held according to this approach if no ultimate owner can be identified using 
the WLP and the relevant threshold value of voting rights. 
 
  The absence of any theoretical foundation for the application of the WLP to 
the measurement of control rights in a control chain leads to a problem illustrated in 
the following example. Consider two control chains. In the first, ultimate owner 4 has 
26 per cent of the voting rights in firm C, which has 25 per cent of the voting rights in 
firm D. In the second, ultimate owner 5 has 90 per cent of the voting rights in firm E, 
which has 25 per cent of the voting rights in firm F. According to the WLP, the 
control rights of 4 in firm D and of 5 in firm F are identical, at 25 per cent. Such a 
conclusion seems counter-intuitive, since although the two intermediate firms have 
identical voting rights in the firms at the bottom of the control chains, ultimate owner 
5 has a far greater degree of control over firm E than does ultimate owner 4 over firm 
C, and it is difficult to accept that this difference should have no effect on the control 
rights of the two ultimate owners in the firms at the bottom of the control chains. One 
problem with the WLP is thus that ultimate owners with apparently very different   8 
degrees of control over firms at the bottom of control chains are sometimes measured 
as having similar, or identical, control rights. 
 
It is possible for two or more ultimate owners to be identified by the WLP 
method employed by La Porta et al. When this happens, they “assign control to the 
shareholder  with  the  largest  …  voting  stake”.
6 Their justification for ignoring the 
control rights of ultimate owners whose voting rights are not the largest single holding 
in a firm appears to be their finding that in 75 per cent of the cases they consider there 
is no large shareholder other than the one with the largest voting rights stake.
7 This 
justification  is  not  convincing:  it  means  that,  in  one  quarter  of  their  cases,  the 
implications of there being more than one ultimate owner with significant control 
rights (for example, possible limitations on the control rights of the largest owner 
because of monitoring by other large owners) are simply ignored. Faccio et al. (2001) 
use the WLP and a threshold value of 20 per cent for voting rights to identify the 
largest ultimate owner in firms in their sample. They find that 45.3 per cent of the 
European firms in their sample with such a controlling owner had another ultimate 
owner with at least 10 per cent of the voting rights. Among the Asian firms in their 
sample, 32.2 per cent of firms had another large ultimate owner as well as the largest 
was. It is clear that simply dismissing the existence of more than one ultimate owner 
with  significant  control  rights  is  potentially  very  misleading.  Faccio  et  al.  use  a 
multiple  owners  dummy  variable  to  take  account  of  such  cases  in  some  of  their 
empirical  analysis,  but  the  widespread  existence  of  firms  with  two  or  more  large 
ultimate owners raises serious questions about the adequacy of the WLP as a basis for 
measuring the control rights of ultimate owners. 
 
An  example  of  the  problems  created  by  the  absence  of  any  well-specified 
theoretical basis for the WLP is provided by the case of Linotype-Hell, one of the 
German firms in our sample. Figure 1 illustrates the ownership of this firm. In 1991, 
the largest voting block (33.33 per cent) was held by Siemens AG (a corporation), 
while the second-largest holder of voting rights was the firm Frega, with 16.67 per 
cent. The remaining voting rights were dispersed. Of the voting rights in Siemens, 10 
per cent were owned by the Siemens family, with the rest again being dispersed. Of 
                                                 
6 La Porta et al. (1999), page 478, definition of widely-held. 
7 La Porta et al. (1999), page 505.   9 
the voting rights in Frega, 40 per cent were owned by Commerzbank, with three other 
owners each having 20 per cent. The largest first-tier holding of voting rights was that 
of Siemens AG, and, applying the WLP in its La Porta et al. version, this means that 
 













the ultimate owner of Linotype-Hell was the Siemens family, with control rights of 10 
per cent. But it is far from obvious that this is an appropriate measure of the control 
rights of the largest owners of Linotype-Hell. If the WLP is applied to the control 
chain from Commerzbank to Linotype-Hell, Commerzbank would be assigned control 
rights  of  16.67  per  cent  –  a  larger  value  than  that  of  the  Siemens  family.  Since 
Commerzbank  may  have  had  a  less  powerful  position  in  Frega  than  the  Siemens 
family had in Siemens AG (because three other owners each held 20 per cent of the 
voting  rights  in  Frega),  and  Frega  has  fewer  voting  rights  in  Linotype-Hell  than 
Siemens AG, it is not obvious whether Commerzbank has higher control rights in 
Linotype-Hell than the Siemens family. The point, however, is that the WLP cannot 
be applied in an obvious way to firms with multiple owners and multiple control 
chains.   
 
An additional drawback of the WLP is that using a threshold value of voting 
rights  to  identify  a  controlling  owner  ignores  the  effect  on  the  power  of  a  given 
holding of voting rights of the distribution of the remaining voting rights across other 
owners, a point heavily emphasised in the literature on voting power indices. In their 
discussion  of  the  WLP,  La  Porta  et  al.  recognise  that  interactions  between  large   10 
owners are theoretically important for measures of ownership concentration, but they 
do not attempt to measure such concentration because they lack a satisfactory model 
of these interactions.
8  Objections can certainly be raised to the theoretical models  
underlying the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf approaches to these interactions, but it is 
not clear that ignoring interactions altogether is a better approach. Faccio et al. use a 
multiple owners dummy variable to take some account of the existence of several 
large owners. However, their  approach would, for example, treat an owner with 21 
per cent of the voting rights in a firm in which the remaining voting rights were 
dispersed as having the same control rights as an owner with 21 per cent of the voting 
rights in a firm in which three other owners each held 9 per cent of the voting rights. 
Any approach to the measurement of control rights that uses thresholds in an attempt  
to  bypass  the  question  of  interactions  between  owners  is  potentially  misleading, 
because an owner’s control rights are not uniquely determined by the value of her 
voting rights. 
 
2.3 Voting power indices, pyramids and control rights 
 
  Consider an example in which firm M has a single large owner, firm N, which 
has 10 per cent of the voting rights, while the remaining 90 per cent are dispersed 
among  an  ocean  of  small  shareholders.  Suppose  that  firm  N  is  owned  by  three 
shareholders (1, 2 and 3) with voting rights of 45 per cent, 35 per cent and 20 per cent 
respectively. There is only one chain of control in this example, which leads to three 
ultimate  owners.  The  smallest  value  in  the  chain  of  control  is  the  10  per  cent 
ownership of firm M by firm N. The WLP as used by La Porta et al. would assign 
ultimate ownership of firm M to shareholder 1, with control rights of 10 per cent, if a 
threshold value of 10 per cent were used, but would treat firm M as widely held if a 
threshold value of 20 per cent were used. Since La Porta et al. explicitly eschew the 
use of measures of ownership concentration and focus instead on identifying a single 
owner  with  effective  control,  they  would  assign  the  control  rights  in  firm  N  to 
shareholder 1 and assign a value of zero to the control rights of shareholders 2 and 3 
in firm N, and hence in firm M. This is not easily justifiable. The approach used by 
Faccio et al. would recognise the existence of multiple ultimate owners of firm M 
                                                 
8 La Porta et al. (1999), page 476.   11 
using a 10 per cent threshold value, but it is not clear what numerical values would be 
assigned to their control rights.  
 
  It  is  straightforward  to  apply  voting  power  indices  to  the  question  of 
measuring the control rights of ultimate owners at the top of pyramid structures, as 
can be shown using the example just discussed. The SSI of firm N’s voting power in 
firm M is 11.11 per cent. Each of the three owners of firm N has voting power of 
33.33 per cent in it according to the SSI, and thus each ultimate owner of firm M has 
voting power of 3.7 per cent in M (3.7 per cent is 33.33 per cent of 11.11 per cent). 
According to the SSI, the remaining 88.89 per cent of the voting power in firm M 
belongs to the ocean of small shareholders, each of which has infinitesimally small 
voting rights. In contrast, the BZI of firm N’s voting power in firm M is 100 per cent. 
Since each of the three owners of firm N has voting power of 33.33 per cent in it 
according to the BZI, each of firm M’s ultimate owners has voting power of 33.33 per 
cent when the BZI is used. 
 
  It is instructive to apply the SSI and the BZI to the case of Linotype-Hell 
considered in Section 2.2. Assuming that the unobserved shareholdings are distributed 
among an ocean of small shareholders, Siemens AG has a SSI of 44.44 per cent in 
Linotype-Hell and Frega has a SSI of 11.12 per cent. The Siemens family has a SSI of 
11.11 per cent in Siemens AG, and Commerzbank has a SSI of 50 per cent in Frega. 
Thus, according to the SSI, the control rights of the Siemens family in Linotype-Hell 
are 4.94 per cent, while those of Commerzbank are 5.56 per cent. In this case, the 
application of the SSI to the measurement of the control rights of ultimate owners is 
conceptually straightforward and produces intuitively plausible results, namely that it 
is hard to say which of Commerzbank and the Siemens family has the largest control 
rights in Linotype-Hell. According to the BZI, however, Siemens AG has 100 per cent 
of the voting power in Linotype-Hell, and the Siemens family has 100 per cent of the 
voting power in Siemens AG, so the Siemens family has all the control rights in 
Linotype-Hell and Commerzbank has none. Although it is straightforward to apply 
the BZI to Linotype-Hell, the results it produces are not intuitively plausible, because 
of the behaviour of the BZI in the oceanic case. 
   12 
  The WLP lacks a theoretical foundation, and thus it is not clear how to apply it 
to control chains of any degree of complexity. In contrast, the SSI and the BZI can be 
applied  to  any  control  chains,  however  complex.  The  principles  illustrated  in  the 
examples  above  carry  over  to  the  general  case:  to  measure  the  control  rights  of 
ultimate owners in a control chain, the SSI and BZI are applied at all tiers in the 
control chain to obtain the voting power of the owners at each tier, and the control 
rights of the ultimate owners are obtained by working down the control chain from the 
top tier to the bottom one. In the next section, measures of control rights of ultimate 
owners obtained using the WLP, SSI and BZI are compared for a sample of German 
firms. 
 
3. Control rights measures for listed German firms 
 
  The starting point for our sample of 97 listed German firms was the data on 
ownership at the end of 1991 collected by Nibler (1998) for 158 of the largest 200 
non-financial German firms measured by turnover. Nibler’s sample comprised all the 
firms  in  the  largest  200  in  1991  that  had  not  experienced  significant  changes  in 
ownership over the period 1988-92. To arrive at our sample of 97, we excluded the 
unlisted  firms  from  Nibler’s  sample.  Our  sample  of  97  comprises  all  listed 
corporations from the largest 200 non-financial firms except 5, which were excluded 
because it was not possible to establish their ownership at the end of 1991 due to the 
existence of control contests.
9 With a total of 563 listed German corporations in 1991, 
our sample accounts for a large proportion of the economic activity carried out by 
listed German firms. For these 97 firms we supplemented Nibler’s data by collecting 
information concerning some balance-sheet ratios, the ratio of market value of equity 
to  book  value  of  equity,  and  ownership.  For  the  latter,  we  used  three  sources  - 
Nibler’s data, Wegweiser durch deutsche Unternehmen (published by Hypo-Bank), 
and Wer gehört zu Wem (published by Commerzbank) – to record all first-tier owners 
of firms with large enough holdings to be identified in these sources. When a first-tier 
owner was itself a closely-held firm, i.e., a firm with one or more identifiable large 
owners, we recorded the owners of that firm, and if any of these second-tier owners 
                                                 
9 These five firms were Continental, Dyckerhoff & Widmann, Th. Goldschmidt, Hoesch, and Philipp 
Holzmann.  See  Jenkinson  and  Ljungqvist  (2001)  for  discussion  of  the  problems  involved  in 
establishing the ownership of these firms, given the form that control contests take in Germany.    13 
were firms, we recorded their ownership, and so on until we established the ultimate 
owners. We classified ultimate owners into five different types: families (including 
foundations set up by families), widely-held domestic firms (both financial and non-
financial),  public-sector  bodies,  cooperatives,  and  foreign  parent  firms.  A  sixth 
ownership category was used for first-tier owners: closely-held firms. For each owner, 
the share of voting rights at the end of 1991 was measured, and used to establish both 
the largest and second-largest first-tier owners (i.e., taking no account of pyramid 
ownership structures), and the largest and second-largest ultimate owners (i.e., tracing 
ownership  through  pyramids  where  necessary).  The  measurement  of  voting  rights 
took  account  of  all  relevant  features,  such  as  the  existence  of  non-voting  shares, 
multiple voting shares, and voting caps. Our recording of ownership structures also 
included information about multiple control chains and cross-holdings.
10 In all but one 
case, multiple control chains and cross-holdings were incorporated into our measures 
of  ultimate  ownership  straightforwardly.  The  exception  is  the  insurance  company 
Allianz, which is an important owner of firms in our sample, and which in 1991 
owned the largest proportion of voting rights in both the largest and one of its joint 
second-largest  holders  of  its  voting  rights  (the  insurance  company  Münchener 
Rückversicherung and Dresdner Bank respectively). Since Allianz appeared to control 
itself, it was classified as a widely-held firm.
11 
 
  Panel A of Table 1 shows the control rights of the largest and second-largest 
first-tier owners measured in three different ways: by voting rights (suffix VR), by the 
SSI in the oceanic case (suffix SS), and by the BZI in the oceanic case (suffix BZ). 
The control rights of ultimate owners were also measured in three different ways: by 
the WLP (suffix WL), by the SSI in the oceanic case, and by the BZI in the oceanic 
case. Panel B shows the control rights of the largest ultimate owner, and, when the 





                                                 
10 Multiple control chains occur when there is more than one chain of voting rights from firms to their 
ultimate owners, while cross-holdings occur when a firm owns voting rights in a firm in its control 
chain. 
11 La Porta et al. (1999, p. 486) also classify Allianz as widely-held. 
12 As has been noted, the WLP offers no guidance on how to treat the control rights of owners other 
than the largest.   14 
Table 1: Measures of control rights of largest owners 
 
A: First-tier owners 
Per cent  CR1VR  CR2VR  CR1SS  CR2SS  CR1BZ  CR2BZ 
100  7  0  46  0  75  0 
>75-<100  12  0  6  0  0  0 
>50-75  26  0  4  0  1  0 
>25-50  27  11  21  4  8  7 
>10-25  13  20  9  15  2  6 
>0-10  1  11  0  8  0  0 
0  11  55  11  70  11  84 
Mean  47.17  17.61
a  65.47  12.79
a  81.51  28.22
a 
Median  49  14.9
a  96.08  11.28
a  100  33.33
a 
             
B: Ultimate owners 
Per cent  UCR1WL    UCR1SS  UCR2SS  UCR1BZ  UCR2BZ 
100  7    47  0  72  0 
>75-<100  11    5  0  1  0 
>50-75  31    5  0  3  0 
>25-50  21    16  4  8  7 
>10-25  14    11  11  2  6 
>0-10  2    2  12  0  0 
0  11    11  70  11  84 
Mean  47.82    64.14  12.77
a  80.74  28.02
a 
Median  50.1    96.08  11.07
a  100  33.33
a 
             
Note. (a) Means and medians for second-largest owners are calculated for positive values only 
 
 
A striking feature of Table 1 is the very small effect that tracing ownership 
through pyramids has on measures of owners’ control rights, despite the fact that in 27 
cases the largest first-tier owner was a closely-held firm and in 18 cases the second-
largest first-tier owner was a closely-held firm. Comparing the control rights figures 
for first-tier and ultimate owners given by each of the three measures shows that the 
mean, median and distribution of control rights for each measure are very similar.   15 
However, although tracing ownership through pyramids has small effects, the three 
different  measures  produce  substantial  differences  in  the  control  rights  figures,  as 
would be expected. Since both the SSI and BZI assign complete control to an owner 
with voting rights of 50% or more, but an owner has complete control according to 
the voting rights or WLP measures only with 100% of the voting rights, very many 
more  owners  have  complete  control  according  to the SSI and BZI measures. The 
number of ultimate owners with complete control is much greater if the BZI rather 
than the SSI is used, because of the behaviour of the BZI in the oceanic case. The 
number  of  first-tier  second-largest  owners  with  non-zero  control  rights  is  smaller 
when the SSI and BZI measures are used than when the voting rights measure is used. 
By its nature, the WLP does not identify any  second-largest ultimate owners, but both 
the SSI and the BZI do (15 with control rights of more than 10 per cent according to 
the former, and 13 according to the latter). The distributions of control rights given in 
Table 1 show clearly that different measures yield substantially different views of the 
control  rights  of  large  owners,  although  the  extent  of  these  differences  is  hardly 
affected at all by whether first-tier or ultimate ownership is considered.  
 
  Although taking account of ownership exercised via pyramid structures has, 
for our sample of large German firms, very little effect on largest owners’ control 
rights, the most important question is whether it increases the separation between the 
control and cash-flow rights of the largest owner. We measured the cash-flow rights 
of the largest first-tier owners as the fraction of total dividends paid in 1991 that such 
owners received, which we obtained using the proportions of voting and non-voting 
shares held by this owner, and the dividends paid to voting and non-voting shares.
13 
For the largest ultimate owners, cash-flow rights were measured by taking the product 
of  the  cash-flow  rights  at  each  ownership  tier,  measured  by  the  fraction  of  total 
dividends received by the relevant owner at each tier. Table 2 shows the correlation 
coefficients  between  the  control  and  cash-flow  rights  of  the  largest  first-tier  and 
largest ultimate owner, where, as usual, control rights are measured in three different 
ways. The identity of the largest first-tier owner was unaffected by the measure of 
control rights, and hence there is a single measure of the largest first-tier owner’s 
cash-flow rights (CF1). In a small number of cases, the identity of the largest ultimate 
                                                 
13 In Germany non-voting shares typically receive a slightly higher dividend than voting shares, and in 
1991 payments to shareholders had to take the form of dividends.   16 
Table 2: Correlations between largest owner’s control and cash-flow rights according 
to different measures 
 
  CR1SS  CR1BZ  CF1  UCR1WL  UCR1SS  UCR1BZ  UCF1WL  UCF1SS  UCF1BZ 
CR1VR  0.873  0.666  0.914  0.929  0.828  0.635  0.851  0.852  0.850 
CR1SS    0.756  0.811  0.802  0.900  0.669  0.722  0.722  0.722 
CR1BZ      0.644  0.625  0.692  0.898  0.552  0.556  0.552 
CF1        0.831  0.754  0.598  0.897  0.898  0.896 
UCR1WL          0.872  0.680  0.875  0.875  0.874 
UCR1SS            0.735  0.804  0.802  0.805 
UCR1BZ              0.592  0.596  0.594 
UCF1WL                0.999  0.999 
UCF1SS                  0.999 
 
    
owner depended on whether control rights were measured according to the WLP, SSI 
or BZI, and thus there are three measures of the largest ultimate owner’s cash-flow 
rights  (UCF1  plus  the  appropriate  suffix).  Table  2  shows  that  taking  account  of 
pyramid structures results in a small increase in the separation between the largest 
owner’s control and cash-flow rights for two of the three measures of control rights. 
The correlation between CR1VR and CF1 is 0.914 while that between UCR1WL and 
UCF1WL is 0.875, and the correlation between CR1BZ and CF1 is 0.644 while that 
between UCR1BZ and UCF1BZ is 0.594. However, the correlation between CR1SS 
and CF1 is 0.811 while that between UCR1SS and UCF1SS is 0.802. Overall, Table 2 
shows that taking account of pyramid ownership structures results in only a very small 
increase in the separation of the largest owner’s control and cash-flow rights, at least 
in terms of the correlation between them.  
 
  The evidence presented in this section shows that the three measures of control 
rights produce substantially different figures for the control rights of large owners in 
our sample of listed German firms. However, neither the figures for control rights nor 
the extent of the separation between the control and cash-flow rights of the largest 
owner  appear  to  be  much  affected  by  whether  ownership  is  traced  back  through 
pyramid structures or not. This raises the question of whether the emphasis placed on 
pyramids in studies of the effects of control and cash-flow rights is justified, an issue  




   17 
4. Regression analysis of the effects of ownership structure on share valuation  
 
  The two previous sections presented six different measures of largest owners’ 
control and cash-flow rights –  first-tier ones using voting rights, the SSI and the BZI, 
and ultimate ones using the WLP, the SSI and the BZI. In this section we attempt to 
establish whether one of these six measures can be regarded as superior to the others. 
Our  earlier  work  (Edwards  and  Weichenrieder  2004)  shows  that  the  ratio  of  the 
market value of a firm’s equity to its book value can be well explained by a regression 
model including both ownership and non-ownership variables. In that paper, the use 
of pyramid ownership structures as a means of separating control and cash-flow rights 
was  not  explicitly  considered.  Instead,  control  rights  of  first-tier  owners  were 
measured by the fraction of votes actually exercised by shareholders at the annual 
shareholder  meeting,  and  cash-flow  rights  were  measured  taking  account  of  the 
different dividend entitlements of voting and non-voting shares. The results showed 
that,  for  most  types  of  largest  shareholder,  increases  in  control  rights  harm,  and 
increases  in cash-flow rights benefit, minority shareholders, with the net effect of 
equal increases in both being beneficial. In the present paper we evaluate the different 
measures of control rights discussed in previous sections by investigating how well 
they perform as ownership variables in this regression model.  
 
The  basic  specification  of  the  regression  model  used  in  Edwards  and 
Weichenrieder (2004) is as follows: 
term Error dummies Industry BETA ASSETS SALESGR
DEBT PEN OTH CR CF CR Intercept MTB
+ + + + +




6 5 4 3 2 1
b b b
b b b b b b
        (1) 
Here MTB is the ratio of market to book value of equity capital, with market value 
measured on 31-12-1991 and book value being the 1991 figure. CR1 and CF1 are 
measures of the largest owner’s control and cash-flow rights respectively, and CR2 is 
a measure of the second-largest owner’s control rights, all of these being the late 1991 
figures. OTH, PEN and DEBT are the other provision, pension provision and debt 
ratios respectively, and ASSETS is total assets, all being the 1991 figures from the 
accounts. SALESGR is the proportional increase in firm sales between 1991 and 1990. 
BETA is a measure of idiosyncratic risk of each company. The reasons for including   18 
the non-ownership right-hand-side variables in the regression model are discussed in 
Edwards and Weichenrieder (2004): here we focus on the ownership variables.  
 
  A marginal shareholder in a firm will receive returns equal to his pro rata 
share of the firm’s total profits less any private benefits of control appropriated by the 
dominant owner.
14 If returns to a marginal shareholder are correctly anticipated, the 
price of the firm’s shares will be given by the present value of these returns. If total 
profits are proportional to the book value of equity capital employed, the ratio of 
market to book value of equity capital will be lower the higher are the private benefits 
of control. Our basic hypotheses are first that, other things equal, the higher the largest 
owner’s control rights, the higher the private benefits of control appropriated, and thus 
the lower is market value relative to book value. Second, we hypothesise that the 
higher  this  owner’s  cash-flow  rights,  the  lower  the  private  benefits  of  control 
appropriated, and thus the higher is market value relative to book value. Third, we 
hypothesise that, other things equal, the higher the control rights of the second-largest 
owner, the lower the private benefits appropriated (because the largest owner has to 
reckon with the presence of a second owner with non-trivial control rights), and thus 
the higher is market value relative to book value. 
 
  The  firms  in  our  sample  have  several  different  types  of  large  owner.  The 
behaviour of largest owners that are organisations run by agents may differ from that 
of largest owners that are families, since there is a much clearer relationship between 
the market value of equity and the wealth of the largest owner in the latter case. It is 
not obvious that, for such owners, greater control rights will lead to lower market-to-
book ratios, and greater cash-flow rights to higher ones. To test whether the effects of 
largest  owners’  control  and  cash-flow  rights  differ  by  type  of  owner,  we  use 
interactive variables to identify the largest owner as either a family, a widely-held 
domestic firm, a public sector body, a cooperative sector body, or a foreign parent 
firm.  When  using  first-tier  ownership  variables,  we  also  include  an  interactive 
variable to identify largest first-tier owners that are closely-held firms. 
 
                                                 
14 In principle minority holders of shares with voting rights could also expect some return because these 
voting rights had a significant probability of being pivotal in control contests. In practice, however, 
such gains to minority shareholders are virtually zero in Germany (Franks and Mayer, 2001).   19 
4.1 Results using first-tier ownership measures 
 
  Table 3 shows the results obtained when different versions of the regression 
model  were  estimated  using  first-tier  ownership  measures.  All  equations  were 
estimated  using  OLS  and  the  White  heteroscedasticity-consistent  estimator  of  the 
covariance  matrix.
15  The  approach  used  was,  for  each  measure  of  control  rights 
(voting rights, SSI, BZI), first to estimate a general model (equations (3.1), (3.3) and 
(3.5) in Table 3), and then to impose acceptable restrictions on the general model to 
obtain a simpler model with better-determined coefficient estimates (equations (3.2), 
(3.4) and (3.6)). 
 
There  are  some  differences  between  the  results  obtained  (after  imposing 
restrictions) when control rights were measured respectively by voting rights and by 
the  SSI,  although  these  differences  are  not  great.  In  equation  (3.2),  the  estimated 
coefficient of the largest owner’s control rights is negative and significant, and that of 
the largest owner’s cash-flow rights is positive and significant, for all owner types. In 
equation  (3.4),  the  estimated  coefficient  of  the  largest  owner’s  control  rights  is 
negative  for  all  owner  types except the public sector, but the negative coefficient 
estimates are somewhat less well-determined than in equation (3.2), being significant 
only at the 0.10 level in two cases. The estimated coefficient of the largest owner’s 
cash-flow  rights  is  positive  and  significant  for  all  owner  types  except  the  public 
sector, for which it is negative but insignificant. In (3.2) the estimated coefficient of 
the second-largest owner’s control rights is positive and marginally significant (at the 
0.061 level), but in (3.4) this coefficient, though positive, is not significant.  
 
The results obtained when control rights were measured using the BZI are 
very different. The estimated coefficient of the largest owner’s control rights in (3.6) 
is positive for some owner types and negative for others, and in only two cases is this 
coefficient significant (one being at the 0.10 level).  A similar variation exists in the 
sign of the estimated coefficient of the largest owner’s cash-flow rights, and only the 
estimate for family and foreign owner types is positive and significant. The estimated 
  
                                                 
15 The justification for treating the ownership variables as exogenous is discussed in Section 4.3.   20 
 
Table 3: Regression results using first-tier ownership measures 
  Control rights measured by 
voting rights 
Control rights measured by 
SSI 
Control rights measured by 
BZI 
  Equation Number  Equation Number  Equation Number 
Regressors  3.1  3.2         3.3       3.4       3.5        3.6 
CR1(Family)    -1.90* 
       (1.05) 
    -2.01** 
      (0.83) 
      -1.25* 
      (0.68) 
    -1.00* 
    (0.53) 
    -0.27 
    (0.61) 
    -0.32 
    (0.50) 
CR1(Closely-held 
firm) 
      -5.09*** 
(1.54) 
     -3.85*** 
      (1.07) 
      -0.75 
      (0.97) 
    -1.69*** 
    (0.52) 
     0.25 
    (0.48) 
     0.33 
    (0.45) 
CR1(Widely-held 
firm) 
      -16.47 
  (18.64) 
      -3.53** 
      (1.52) 
      -3.65 
      (2.45) 
    -1.38** 
    (0.67) 
     3.24 
    (3.25) 
     3.46** 
    (1.68) 
CR1(Public)         -2.98 
  (3.30) 
     -5.56*** 
      (1.30) 
       0.24 
      (1.62) 
     0.17 
    (1.68) 
    -0.14 
    (0.95) 
    -0.61 
    (0.51) 
CR1(Cooperative)   0.10 
(1.24) 
    -4.23*** 
      (1.56) 
      -1.71 
      (4.73) 
    -1.84** 
    (0.83) 
     3.04 
    (2.13) 
     3.10* 
    (1.81) 
CR1(Foreign)         -2.61 
       (1.79) 
      -2.57** 
      (1.05) 
      -1.99 
      (1.23) 
    -1.44* 
    (0.67) 
    -0.68 
    (0.79) 
    -0.62 
    (0.59) 
CF1(Family)         4.23*** 
(1.38) 
         3.65*** 
      (1.15) 
       2.31** 




       5.69*** 
       (1.54) 
 
 
       1.70 
      (1.64) 
       0.26 
    (0.95) 
     0.47 





         7.49 
      (4.56) 
      -5.05 
    (7.10) 
    -6.03 
    (7.01) 
CF1(Public)         1.72 
(3.45) 
        -1.85 
      (2.98) 
    -1.64 
    (3.08) 
    -1.00 
    (2.30) 
    -1.02 
    (2.32) 
CF1(Cooperative)  - 
 
         3.06 
      (7.46) 
      -5.37 
    (4.06) 
    -4.79 
    (4.11) 
CF1(Foreign.)          4.42** 
       (2.21) 
         3.89** 
      (1.78) 
           2.50* 
    (1.36) 
  
CF1(All)                   4.41*** 
      (1.02) 
            
CF1(All except 
Public) 
           3.35*** 
    (0.80) 
   
CF1(Family  and 
Foreign) 
               2.40*** 
    (0.83) 
CF1(Closely-held 
and Public) 
               0.07 
    (0.85) 
CF1(Cooperative 
and Widely-held) 
              -5.52 
    (3.49) 
CR2    2.27* 
(1.21) 
       2.11* 
      (1.11) 
       1.36 
      (1.98) 
     1.94 
    (1.65) 
     0.46 
    (1.17) 
     0.41 
    (1.10) 
             
R
2  0.6085  0.6044  0.5987  0.5860  0.5680  0.5662 
Adjusted R
2  0.4306    0.4073    0.3620   
Notes: ***, **, * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level respectively. Heteroscedasticity-
consistent  standard  errors  are  in  parentheses.  All  equations  include  a  constant  term  and  the  other 
control variables specified in (1), the coefficients of which are not reported. 
 
 
coefficient of the second-largest owner’s control rights is positive but not significant. 
Using the BZI to measure control rights produces estimates of the effects of largest   21 
owners’ control and cash-flow rights on the market-to-book ratio that differ greatly 
from those obtained using the other two measures both in sign and significance. 
 
4.2 Results using ultimate ownership measures 
 
  Table 4 shows the results obtained when the same approach was employed to 
estimate  different  versions  of  the  regression  model  using  ultimate  ownership 
measures.  When  control  rights  were  measured  using  the  WLP,  only  the  largest 
owner’s control rights were included as regressors, for the reasons already noted.  
 
   In both equation (4.2) (in which control rights were measured using the WLP) 
and equation (4.4) (in which the SSI was used) the estimated coefficient of the control 
rights of largest owners that are public sector bodies is positive but not significant, 
while that for their cash-flow rights is negative and significant. For all other largest 
owners except widely-held domestic firms, the estimated control-rights coefficient is 
negative in both equations, although these coefficients are better determined in (4.4), 
and  the  estimated  cash-flow-rights  coefficient  is  positive  in  both  equations.  The 
control rights of second-largest owners do not appear in (4.2), while in (4.4) their 
estimated coefficient, though positive, is not significantly different from zero. The 
only difference between (4.2) and (4.4) concerns largest owners that are widely-held 
firms. In (4.2) the estimated coefficient of these owners’ control rights is positive and 
significant,  while  the  estimated  coefficient  of  their  cash-flow  rights  is  negative 
(though insignificant) and significantly different from the estimated coefficient of all 
other largest owners’ cash-flow rights except public sector bodies. However, in (4.4) 
the estimated coefficient of these owners’ control rights is negative and significant, 
while that of their cash-flow rights is positive and not significantly different from that 
of all other largest owners’ cash-flow rights except public sector bodies. 
 
When ultimate ownership was measured using the BZI (equation (4.6)), the 
results  are  very  different.  The  only  estimated  coefficient  of  largest  owner  control 
rights that is significant is for widely-held domestic firms, but it is positive. The sign 
of the estimated coefficient of the largest owner’s cash-flow rights varies, and only 
the estimate for family and foreign owner types is positive and significant. As with 
   22 
Table 4: Regression results using ultimate ownership measures 
  Control rights measured by 
WLP 
Control rights measured by 
SSI 
Control rights measured by 
BZI 
  Equation Number  Equation Number  Equation Number 
Regressors  4.1  4.2         4.3       4.4       4.5        4.6 
CR1(Family)        -1.82* 
      (1.03) 
     -1.54* 
     (0.88) 
      -1.11 
      (0.76) 
    -1.38** 
    (0.56) 
    -0.24 
    (0.48) 
    -0.28 
    (0.40) 
CR1(Widely-held 
firm) 
       3.03** 
      (1.31) 
      2.72** 
     (1.18) 
      -3.34* 
      (1.70) 
    -1.53** 
    (0.64) 
     1.29** 
    (0.54) 
     1.44*** 
    (0.48) 
CR1(Public)         1.15 
      (0.80) 
      1.07 
     (0.75) 
       0.78 
      (0.57) 
     0.80 
    (0.52) 
     0.32 
    (0.48) 
     0.24 
    (0.36) 
CR1(Cooperative)        -1.57 
      (1.83) 
     -3.49*** 
     (1.19) 
      -2.12 
      (1.81) 
    -3.05*** 
    (0.80) 
     0.78 
    (1.39) 
     0.79 
    (0.88) 
CR1(Foreign)        -2.86 
      (1.59) 
     -2.17* 
     (1.16) 
      -2.56* 
      (1.41) 
    -2.13*** 
    (0.68) 
    -0.78 
    (0.84) 
    -0.64 
    (0.49) 
CF1(Family)         4.04*** 
      (1.39) 
         3.21** 
      (1.30) 
       2.26** 




      -1.55 
      (1.96) 
     -1.31 
     (1.86) 
       7.41** 
      (3.43) 
      -0.89 
    (1.63) 
    
CF1(Public)        -2.45** 
      (1.18) 
     -2.42** 
     (1.16) 
      -2.86** 
      (1.27) 
    -2.97** 
    (1.19) 
    -1.69 
    (1.48) 
     
CF1(Cooperative)         1.50 
      (1.67)       
         2.35 
      (2.42) 
      -1.40 
    (1.72) 
     
CF1(Foreign.)         4.37** 
      (2.01) 
         4.25** 
      (1.96) 
           2.52* 





        3.59*** 
     (1.11) 
       
CF1(All except 
Public) 
           3.66*** 
    (0.86) 
   
CF1(Family and 
Foreign) 
               2.35*** 
    (0.71) 
CF1(Public, Coop 
and Widely-held) 
              -1.41 
    (0.92) 
CR2             0.30 
      (1.02) 
     1.09 
    (0.89) 
    -0.15 
    (0.82) 
    -0.14 
    (0.73)  
             
R
2  0.5915  0.5870  0.6114  0.6033  0.5777  0.5768 
Adjusted R
2  0.4233  0.4335  0.4432    0.3949   
Notes: ***, **, * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level respectively. Heteroscedasticity-
consistent  standard  errors  are  in  parentheses.  All  equations  include  a  constant  term  and  the  other 




first-tier ownership, the estimates of the effects of largest owners’ control and cash-
flow rights on the market-to-book ratio obtained when the BZI was used to measure 
control rights of ultimate owners differ greatly in sign and significance from those 
obtained using the other two measures. 
 
   23 
4.3 Testing the assumption of exogenous ownership 
 
  The regression equations reported in Tables 3 and 4 were all estimated by 
OLS,  which  will  not  yield  consistent  estimates  if  the  ownership  variables  are 
endogenous.  To  test  whether  our  assumption  that  the  ownership  variables  are 
exogenous was justifiable, we estimated a slightly modified version of the restricted 
models in Tables 3 and 4 by instrumental variables (IV). The instruments for the 
ownership variables were as follows. First, turnover, an alternative measure of firm 
size to that included as an explanatory variable, since an inverse relationship between 
size and ownership concentration would be expected. Second, age, on the grounds that 
the older a firm is, the less likely is it to have concentrated ownership because of the 
holdings of its founders. Third, the risk measure (BETA) included as an explanatory 
variable  in  all  equations  reported  in  Tables  3  and  4,  but  which  was  always 
insignificant. The higher a firm’s specific risk, the lower its ownership concentration 
is likely to be, for diversification reasons. Fourth, a dummy variable showing which 
of the firms in our sample had the same largest shareholder in 1979 as in 1991 (57 of 
them  did  so).  The  final  instruments  were  dummy  variables  indicating  the  type  of 
largest  owner  (family,  public  sector,  etc.).  In  the  first-stage  regressions  of  the 
ownership  variables  on  these  instruments  the  null  hypothesis  that  the  estimated 
coefficients of all the instruments were zero was always strongly rejected, so these 
instruments are reasonably well correlated with the ownership variables. Hausman 
tests  of  the  significance  of  the  differences  between  the  OLS  and  IV  coefficient 
estimates of the restricted equations in Tables 3 and 4 (excluding BETA) did not reject 
the null hypothesis of no difference.
16 Given the instruments available, there is no 
evidence that the results reported in Tables 3 and 4 are dependent on the inappropriate 
use of OLS as an estimation method.  
 
These regression results show that there is a stronger relationship between the 
market-to-book ratio and largest owners’ control and cash-flow rights when control 
rights are measured using either voting rights and the WLP or the SSI than when they 
are measured using the BZI. The BZI is thus an unsatisfactory measure of control 
                                                 
16 Under the null hypothesis of exogenous ownership variables, both OLS and IV are consistent but IV 
is inefficient, whereas under the alternative IV is consistent but OLS is not. Hence, under the null 
hypothesis, the two sets of coefficient estimates should not differ significantly.   24 
rights. However, in terms of the estimates of the regression model, it is clear neither 
whether voting rights and the WLP are a better measure of control rights than the SSI 
nor  whether  first-tier  ownership  measures  are  superior  to  ultimate  ownership 
measures. To investigate this further, we use non-nested tests of the various regression 
models in Tables 3 and 4. 
 
4.4 Non-nested testing of ownership measures 
 
  The  problem  we  face,  conditional  on  equation  (1)  being  the  appropriate 
regression model, is that of determining which of several possible sets of ownership 
variables is the appropriate set of regressors. This is a standard problem of choice 
among non-nested models, and we tested each of the models given by equations (3.1), 
(3.3), (3.5), (4.1), (4.3) and (4.5) against the five others using a J test.
17 The results are 
summarised in Table 5. Focussing initially on the tests of the three ultimate ownership 
models against each other, the model in which ownership is measured by the SSI (4.3) 
is only rejected at the 0.10 level by the models in which ownership is measured by the 
WLP (4.1) and the BZI (4.5). Both the other ultimate ownership models are rejected at 
the 0.01 level by the ultimate SSI model. This suggests that the ultimate ownership 
model in which control rights are measured by the SSI is superior to the other two 
ultimate ownership models. However, although this model is neither rejected by the 
model in which first-tier ownership is measured using the SSI (3.3) nor by that in 
which it is measured using the BZI (3.5), it is rejected at the 0.01 level by the model 
in  which  first-tier  ownership  is  measured  using  voting  rights  (3.1).  Model  (3.1), 
however, is rejected at the 0.01 level by all three ultimate ownership models. Thus, as 
is possible in non-nested hypothesis testing, the results in Table 5 show that none of 
the models tested are fully adequate: all models are rejected at the 0.01 level by at 
least one other model. 
 
The results of the non-nested tests do not permit unambiguous answers to the 
questions of whether first-tier ownership measures are superior to ultimate ones, and 
whether voting rights and the WLP are better measures of control rights than the 
 
                                                 
17 Davidson and MacKinnon (1981).   25 
Table 5: Results of non-nested tests 
 
 
First-tier ownership  Ultimate ownership   
VR  SS  BZ  WL  SS  BZ 
 
Model  (3.1)  (3.3)  (3.5)  (4.1)  (4.3)  (4.5) 
VR  (3.1)  -  R**  R*  R***  R***  R*** 




BZ  (3.5)  R***  R***  -  R***  R***  R** 
WL  (4.1)  R***  R***  R*  -  R***  R* 




BZ  (4.5)  R***  R***  NR  R**  R***  - 
Notes: Each cell shows the result of testing the row model against the column model by a J test. R 
indicates that the row model was rejected by the column model, and NR indicates that the row model 
was not rejected by the column model. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level 
respectively.   
 
 
SSI. If, in order to assess the effects of the largest owner’s control and cash-flow  
rights on minority shareholders, the maintained hypothesis is that ownership must be 
traced through pyramid structures, then our results suggest that the SSI is superior to 
the WLP. But our results do not support the maintained hypothesis that ownership is 
better  measured  at  the  ultimate  than  at  the  first-tier  level.  First-tier  ownership 
measures  add  something  to  the  explanation  of  the  market-to-book  ratio  given  by 
ultimate ones (in the case of the ultimate SSI model admittedly only the first-tier 
voting  rights  model  does  this),  just  as  ultimate  measures  add  something  to  the 
explanation given by first-tier ones. This means that the ultimate SSI model can, at 
best, be described as the model that suffers the smallest number of rejections by other 
models.  
 
  The inability to identify an unambiguously best regression model means that 
some aspects of the conflict of interest between controlling and minority shareholders 
in large German firms remain unclear. Irrespective of how ownership is measured – at 
first-tier or ultimate levels, by voting rights and the WLP or the SSI – increases in the 
control  rights  of  most  types  of  largest  owner  reduce  the  market-to-book  ratio, 
implying that minority shareholders are harmed by such increases, while increases in 
the cash-flow rights of most largest owners raise the market-to-book ratio, implying   26 
that minority shareholders benefit from such increases. However, the different models 
do not give a completely consistent picture. For example, increases in the control 
rights of largest owners that are widely-held domestic firms are estimated to have a 
significant positive effect on the market-to-book ratio if ownership is measured at the 
ultimate level using the WLP, but if ownership is measured at the ultimate level using 
the SSI, or at the first-tier level using either voting rights or the SSI, increases in these 
owners’ control rights are estimated to have a significant negative effect. It is also not 
clear whether minority shareholders benefit from increases in the control rights of the 
second-largest owner: this effect is positive and marginally significant according to 
the  first-tier  model  using  voting  rights,  but  it  is  not  significant  (though  positive) 
according to the ultimate SSI model. 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
  This paper raises several questions about the recent empirical literature on the 
conflict of interest between large and minority shareholders, in which measures of the 
control and cash-flow rights of large shareholders play a critical role. In measuring the 
largest owner’s control and cash-flow rights, this literature has placed great emphasis 
on the need to trace ownership through pyramid structures, and has used the WLP to 
provide measures of the control rights of ultimate owners. We argue that there are a 
number of problems with the use of the WLP, and propose an alternative approach to 
the measurement of control rights based on the use of voting power indices. Such an 
approach  provides  a  more  theoretically  satisfactory  method  of  calculating  control 
rights measures for ultimate owners. It also enables separate measures of control and 
cash-flow rights to be obtained even in the absence of pyramids and dual-class shares.  
 
Our results for a sample of large listed German firms show that, whatever the 
measure used, the differences between control and cash-flow rights measured at the 
first-tier and the ultimate levels are very small. Our results also show that neither first-
tier nor ultimate ownership measures are adequate on their own, which suggests that 
further work on the determinants of ownership structure and the role of pyramids is 
required in order to obtain fully satisfactory measures of large owners’ control and 
cash-flow rights. It is likely that the existence of pyramid ownership structures cannot 
be explained solely in terms of controlling owners’ desire to separate cash-flow and   27 
control rights. A possible additional reason for pyramid structures is that ownership of 
a firm through an intermediate pyramid firm acts as a commitment device for the 
several owners of the firm to exercise their control rights in the same way.  
 
If, however, the maintained hypothesis that ownership should be measured at 
the ultimate level is adopted, as is the case in most of the recent empirical literature, 
our results suggest that the WLP measure of control rights is inferior to the SSI one. 
This  implies  that  the  results  of  the  existing  literature,  which  has  focussed  almost 
exclusively on ultimate ownership using the WLP measure of control rights, must be 
regarded as provisional. Although our results show that some conclusions about the 
effects of large owners’ control and cash-flow rights on minority shareholders are 
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